{"id":458,"date":"1997-12-10T10:52:04","date_gmt":"1997-12-10T15:52:04","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/?p=458"},"modified":"2008-12-03T23:07:22","modified_gmt":"2008-12-04T04:07:22","slug":"what-is-human-freedom","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/1997\/what-is-human-freedom\/","title":{"rendered":"What is human freedom?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The following is a paper from an intro to philosophy course I took at OWU. <\/em><\/p>\n

What is human freedom?\u00a0 Most people claim to possess it, but few, if pressed, can even clearly define it.\u00a0 If hundreds of years of science and philosophy have failed to provide a definition that is well known or ubiquitously accepted, one question immediately comes to mind: are we truly free?\u00a0 Does free will, with all of its consequences, exist, and what are those consequences?<\/p>\n

Though Rousseau did not believe that there was such a thing as human nature, he did provide two possibilities he found most reasonable.\u00a0 The first, freedom, relates directly to our question; the second, a capacity for self-perfection, also supports it.\u00a0 Rousseau saw animals as slaves to instinct.\u00a0 Though they could think in that they could form ideas from observations, all of their motivation was due to inherited programs that worked effectively in the same way as the laws of physics, deterministically.\u00a0 Humans have instincts too, but often override them. \u00a0In that ability to override instincts lays Rousseau’s definition of free will. \u00a0For instance, a boy may skip lunch during an intense session of video games.\u00a0 Though the instinct to eat is present and food is readily available, he overrides it in order to do something which instinct provides him no reason to do.\u00a0 According to Rousseau, an animal would not do so.<\/p>\n

The second candidate for human nature, the ability to advance as a species and as and individual, also supports human freedom.\u00a0 Inanimate matter cannot advance; it has no such goal as survival so it cannot become better at surviving.\u00a0 Animals can, to a very limited degree; most grow to a better-adapted adult stage and all are able to learn to a limited degree through conditioning.\u00a0 But humans are able to make huge leaps and bounds, far surpassing their “natural” abilities, inventing agriculture and factories and CD players.\u00a0 Unless we are to say that humans have an instinct for creativity, using a term that denotes an unchanging motivation to rationalize the human capacity for change, we must question if free will does not perhaps lie behind the human capacity for advancement as well.<\/p>\n

Even in Rousseau’s refutation of freedom as human nature we find support for the existence of this type of free will.\u00a0 Freedom means that all individuals are able to act differently and against instinct.\u00a0 Thus, the only thing we have in common is that we’re different.\u00a0 For Rousseau, this is logically unsound; for us, it is a both reaffirmation of free will and new observable evidence of it.\u00a0 We see quite often that different people will act differently in very similar circumstances.\u00a0 So often, in fact, that it seems ludicrous to attribute it all to the effects of tiny physical differences, like room temperature and body weight, rather than the influence of a “free agent” motivation which we have yet to prove improbable, let alone impossible.<\/p>\n

Hobbes, on the other hand, was a materialist.\u00a0 He believed that the mind and body were made of the same thing and subject to the same physical laws.\u00a0 Humans have no soul, and though they are very complicated, they are like clockwork-everything that one does is the result of some “motion” in the brain.\u00a0 Hobbes’ model of these motions assumed that humans were selfish by nature and therefore acted not from free choice but instead for one’s best interests.\u00a0 Unfortunately for Hobbes’ psychological egoism, there are examples of altruistic behavior in society.\u00a0 The only way to reconcile the two is to imagine a controlling subconscious mind, which cannot be observed-much like Descartes’ dualistic self.\u00a0 There is one difference, however; Descartes’ self, soul or mind is virtually another word for free will, whereas the subconscious required for this reconciliation is merely a higher level of control, still based on the unchanging principle that people always do what they think is in their best interest.<\/p>\n

Materialism seems to destroy the possibility of free will altogether.\u00a0 Descartes, though not speaking for free will specifically, argued against materialism.\u00a0 His method of doubt led him to believe that everything learned from the senses were subject to doubt and that only one primary fact can be known: I think, therefore I am.\u00a0 In order even to question whether or not I exist, I must exist in order to think about it.\u00a0 The self is a thinking thing; and since the existence body is not so self evident, it is doubtable, and therefore the mind and the body are two separate things.\u00a0 This opens the door for the existence of free will.\u00a0 If we are to assume that the true self is separate from the physical world, it is not hard to suppose that the mind is also not subject to deterministic laws like the physical world.\u00a0 Any child can tell you what will happen when you drop a baseball, and any high school physics student can tell you it’s speed before it hits the ground if you let him examine it.\u00a0 But the mind is not subject to such laws, and physics, no matter how advanced it becomes, is based upon observation-and the very existence of Descartes’ self hinges on the idea that it is unobservable, but logically evident.<\/p>\n

One of the ideas often used to defend materialism is Ockham’s Razor, the idea that all things being equal, the explanation metaphysically simpler is most likely the correct one.\u00a0 This principle can be applied to the question of free will.\u00a0 Can science (the metaphysically simpler model) completely explain people and their actions without free will?\u00a0 If materialistic science can explain why people act the way they do without including a dualistic soul, then it is most likely correct.\u00a0 On the surface, this seems so, because psychology and sociology have made great advances in doing just that.\u00a0 Unfortunately, every advance has been statistical in nature.\u00a0 Psychology can describe what the average reaction to a stimulus is, but it cannot say what one individual will definitely do in even the most controlled situation.\u00a0 Recent scientific discoveries support the idea that science has definite limits.\u00a0 The Uncertainty Principle in physics, for instance, states that one can only know so much about a particle’s position and velocity at the same time; the more you know about one, the less you can possibly know about the other.\u00a0 Modern science must admit that most likely, it can’t know everything.<\/p>\n

To put it in calculus terms, the limit of psychology’s ability to completely describe and predict an individual or group of people may be at total understanding, but scientific advancement will go on ad infinitum, ever approaching, never reaching that explanation.\u00a0 And it is quite possible that the limit lies well below total understanding.\u00a0 Thus, Ockham’s Razor can’t fully support scientific determinism.\u00a0 Though metaphysically simpler, science cannot fully explain everything.\u00a0 Free will is possible.<\/p>\n

So far I have only discussed two options, free will and materialistic determinism.\u00a0 But in most cases where determinism seems improbable, there lies another possibility: divine design.\u00a0 In every case where one person has said “that action happened because of human freedom,” there has been someone quick to say, “that action happened because god wanted it to.”\u00a0 If this notion is correct, then the non-physical aspect that Descartes speaks of is merely god’s will–most likely unknown to the thinker in question. \u00a0Our seeming individuality or ability to change may be nothing more than a puppet show, with god pulling the strings.\u00a0 Sartre, however, argued that even if an omnipotent, omniscient god existed, it does not matter.\u00a0 Free will, and all the responsibility it includes, exists.<\/p>\n

Sartre’s existentialism relied on the existence of free will.\u00a0 According to the system, existence precedes essence for human beings.\u00a0 That is, human beings are created without a set definition or meaning of life, whereas everything else, from a rock to a hammer to a dog only exists as it has a definition.\u00a0 How can this be?\u00a0 For Christians, god gives us a purpose and defines us before we are born.\u00a0 But for existentialism, everything is relative to the self.\u00a0 They assume the Cartesian definition of the self is true.\u00a0 Then it follows that everything outside the self only exists as it relates to the self-the rock, hammer, or dog, only exist after they are conceptualized by the self, and the very conceptualization provides the definition and purpose of the thing.\u00a0 Essence must precede existence for everything except the self; the self we must first recognize as existing before we can even begin formulation an essence for ourselves.\u00a0 This makes possible the reality of human freedom.<\/p>\n

This view can be considered in accordance with most science.\u00a0 A scientist cannot talk about anything until he has clearly defined what he is talking about; essence precedes existence.\u00a0 But what of god?\u00a0 Existentialism explains that believing in god is a choice in and of itself.\u00a0 Think about it-you’re a devout Christian, and one day the clouds open, trumpets blare, and a voice booms out to you.\u00a0 Do you do what it says?\u00a0 You have no proof that it’s god and not the devil talking to you.\u00a0 In fact, you have no proof it’s not someone with a loudspeaker and good timing.\u00a0 If you do as the voice says, even though you may be able to say you were only following god’s orders, you chose first whether or not to believe that that was god speaking.\u00a0 Even if god exists your choice precedes your actions.\u00a0 That choice is free will.<\/p>\n

The most important consequence of free will for Sartre is responsibility.\u00a0 Since everything you do is ultimately because you chose to do so, you cannot but accept the consequences of your actions as your fault.\u00a0 Thus he defines freedom not as the ability to make choices, but the requirement that you decide all of your actions and the responsibility one has for all of his actions.<\/p>\n

John Locke provided two definitions of human freedom, strong and the weak.\u00a0 Strong freedom is the ability to choose any option; we may do what we’re doing or we may choose not to do what we’re doing.\u00a0 This is Sartre’s concept of human freedom.\u00a0 Freedom in the weak sense means merely that we can do what we want.\u00a0 The two definitions seem similar until you think of it this way: if a prisoner wants to be in jail, he is free in the weak sense and not the strong.\u00a0 For Locke and Sartre, weak freedom is no freedom at all; the prisoner is not free, he is just lucky.\u00a0 Hobbes’ materialism may even be considered freedom in the weak sense; people are free to do what they want, but what they want is determined by laws just like the laws of physics.\u00a0 Rousseau’s definition of freedom is harder to classify.\u00a0 Though he does not address the ideas directly, the ability to go against instinct seems similar to the ability to choose to do anything (or the ability to choose against doing what we’re doing whether we like what we’re doing or not).\u00a0 Though they are not exactly equivalent, Rousseau’s definition of human freedom is at least weak and most likely strong.<\/p>\n

So where are we left?\u00a0 Are we free?\u00a0 Fatalism provides two arguments against free will, and Jonathan Edwards provides another.\u00a0 First, there’s religious predestination.\u00a0 The idea is that an omnipotent, omniscient god knows everything, always.\u00a0 God knows all that someone has done, is doing, and will do.\u00a0 If god knows now what someone will do in the future, how can that person do anything but what god knows he will do?\u00a0 Though the person thinks he is making a free decision (and he or she is, in the weak sense), all his actions must have determined if god knew about them beforehand.\u00a0 There are two ways to refute this argument.\u00a0 First, if there is no god, the idea doesn’t apply.\u00a0 Second, there’s always the possibility that the way in which god knows things defies human logic.\u00a0 He is, after all, god.<\/p>\n

But there is a similar argument that leaves god out of it.\u00a0 If every factual statement is either true or false, then statements about the future are either true or false as well.\u00a0 Though I don’t know if I will be alive tomorrow, I either will or will not.\u00a0 If the statement is true, then there’s nothing I can do tomorrow to stop it from happening; to do so would be to change the past.\u00a0 This also allows for freedom in the weak sense.\u00a0 Since I do not know whether any statement about the future is true or false, I act as though I have free will; but things must be as they must be, and I cannot choose otherwise.\u00a0 Aristotle disagrees with this argument on one point: statements are not true or false until they have happened.<\/p>\n

Jonathan Edwards gives a very different criticism of free will.\u00a0 Let us define willing something as making a choice.\u00a0 An act of will is a volition.\u00a0 Now, if I choose something, there are two possibilities: I may have done so voluntarily or involuntarily.\u00a0 If I did so involuntarily, then that is the end of it; I chose it because I had to.\u00a0 If I did it voluntarily, then it must have been an act of will.\u00a0 Now, was that act of will a voluntary or involuntary choice?\u00a0 If it was voluntary, it was by another act of will, and so on and so on.\u00a0 By this argument, an involuntary act makes perfect sense whereas the existence of free will leads to an infinite spiral of choices.\u00a0 There is one major flaw with this argument though-let us say I make a choice.\u00a0 If it is involuntary, it does indeed stop there, and that is why I did it.\u00a0 But if it is voluntary, then yes, it is an act of will.\u00a0 As for whether that act of will is voluntary, we have already answered that question.\u00a0 That “second” act of will is merely the first; if you make a voluntary decision, the act of will that decision results from is the original act of will.<\/p>\n

So where do we stand?\u00a0 Does free will exist?\u00a0 What is free will?\u00a0 I believe that we must accept at least the weak definition of freedom.\u00a0 There is not a single convincing argument above that rules out the ability to act as you choose without knowledge of the fact that you cannot do otherwise.\u00a0 In fact, since by the definition of weak freedom we don’t know that we are not free, then how can humans figure out that they aren’t?\u00a0 Even if we take predestination as fact, we do not know our future and therefore may act like we have free will anyway.\u00a0 Materialistic determinism is not convincing and modern science is not necessarily deterministic.\u00a0 None of the arguments for fatalism even rule out freedom in the weak sense.\u00a0 Furthermore, I think there is enough doubt in every argument against freedom in the strong sense to say it is quite possible, if not probable.\u00a0 That is to say, we haven’t dis-proven free will in the strong sense, so there is no need to throw it out.<\/p>\n

What are the consequences of this resolution?\u00a0 For one thing, if it is true we have freedom in the weak sense, it seems nearly impossible to prove or disprove the existence of freedom in the strong sense.\u00a0 If we are able to choose what we want to choose, or are made to think we have made a choice when we have in fact done the only thing possible, how can we ever know if we could have chosen otherwise?\u00a0 We cannot go back into the past and try again.\u00a0 As close as circumstances may be, not two decisions or acts of will are exactly the same.\u00a0 My very decision to write this paper was unavoidable, but I can never know that.\u00a0 If I knew it, I would not be free in any sense; if we can predict the future, then we cannot change it and are knowing prisoners of what will happen.\u00a0 If I know I could not have chosen the other topic, then I effectively haven’t made any choice at all.\u00a0 Just like predestination, I am not responsible for any of my actions-I, and everyone else (save perhaps god) are victims of circumstance.<\/p>\n

That is why I choose to believe in my own freedom in the strong sense.\u00a0 I would rather think that my actions are wholly mine to control and that I am responsible for them, as attractive as total lack of fault sounds.\u00a0 I have yet to be convinced that it is impossible, and so I choose it (hopefully freely) because it is the most appealing and logically sound argument to me.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The following is a paper from an intro to philosophy course I took at OWU. What is human freedom?\u00a0 Most people claim to possess it, but few, if pressed, can even clearly define it.\u00a0 If hundreds of years of science and philosophy have failed to provide a definition that is well known or ubiquitously accepted, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[12],"tags":[563,559,428,564,561,429,188,565,562],"class_list":["post-458","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-writing","tag-freedom","tag-hobbes","tag-jean-jacques-rousseau","tag-john-locke","tag-ockhams-razor","tag-philosophy","tag-psychology","tag-sartre","tag-science-and-philosophy"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/458","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=458"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/458\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":459,"href":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/458\/revisions\/459"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=458"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=458"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.jasonmorrison.net\/content\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=458"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}